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With a strong Commons majority behind the government, George Jones and Andrew Blick argue that
whether the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition operates in a different style from its Labour
predecessors will depend strongly on how David Cameron controls the central machinery of power in British
government. Recent history gives us the best pointer we have to what may lie ahead.
The behaviour of David Cameron as Leader of the Opposition suggested that his personal disposition if he
became premier would be to minimise the role of Cabinet. His model for much of his political style appears to
be Tony Blair, and Blair was the most interventionist prime minister since Lloyd George. Blair strongly
preferred operating in small informal fluctuating groups – “sofa government” and “denocracy” – rather than
through the collegial processes of cabinet government.
Blair’s centralized style
Blair’s style of governing required an increase in
his administrative resources. He expanded his
staff at No 10 in the Prime Minister’s Office, and
fused it with an extended Cabinet Office to form
in effect a “quasi-Department of the Prime
Minister”.  The size of the Cabinet Office grew
from about 650 in 1998 to 1,790 in 2004: its
peak was 2,020 in 2002.  Its proliferation of
units, taskforces and czars had to be
accommodated in buildings stretching out from
70 Whitehall along Horseguards to Admiralty
Arch.
Under Thatcher and Major the staff at No 10
serving the prime minister had numbered
around 90 people; by 1998 they had risen to
121; and by 2005 had peaked at nearly 226. 
Within this group a big increase took place in
the special advisers serving the prime minister.
Major had 8: Blair in 1998 had 16, rising to a peak of 28 in 2004. In the Cabinet Office beyond No.10 staff
serving the prime minister rose to the high 500s. Thus Blair had 782 staff under him in both the Prime
Minster’s Office and the Cabinet Office – a Prime Minister’s Department in all but name.
The way Blair absorbed and commandeered the Cabinet Office can be seen in the changing terms of
reference of the Cabinet Office during his period. The traditional role of the Cabinet Office was to provide
support for collective government, serving the prime minister in his capacity as chairman of the cabinet.
From 1998 a succession of official definitions of the roles of the Cabinet Office diminished its task of
supporting collective decision making, by 2002 eliminating any mention of cabinet and collective. The MP
Kelvin Hopkins noted in 2005 that “Cabinet Office targets seem to relate almost entirely to the Prime Minister
and not to supporting the Cabinet as such.”
Blair downplayed not only cabinet processes but the House of Commons too. He moved the Chief Whip out
of the splendid set of offices in No 12 Downing Street to rooms accessed through the Cabinet Office
overlooking the lower part of Downing Street. Into the Chief Whip’s offices he put his Chief Press Secretary,
Alastair Campbell, showing he regarded the media as more important than the House of Commons.
Campbell by Order in Council was given legal authority to issue instructions to civil servants, as was
Jonathan Powell, who was Blair’s Chief of Staff.
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The trio of Blair, Powell and Campbell headed a virtual Prime Minister’s Department, assisted by Cabinet
Secretaries, amongst whom Andrew Turnbull, who held the post from 2002-5, was particularly supportive of
this administrative objective.
Brown at No. 10
When Gordon Brown became Prime
Minister in 2007 he promised a different
approach: to restore collegial processes.
For a time the number of staff in the Prime
Minister’s Office and in the Cabinet Office
fell, but Brown’s reputation as a “Stalinist”
centraliser soon proved well-founded. 
Brown’s special advisers shot up from 18 in
2007 to around 25 in 2010. The Cabinet
Office lost some units and the numbers
there fell to just under 400 staff serving the
Prime Minister in the Cabinet Office and
Prime Minister’s Office combined, but he
continued and in some ways intensified the
style of Blair.
The civil service head of the Prime
Minister’s Office under Brown was Jeremy
Heywood, and he became a permanent
secretary – symbolic in Whitehall that there was a separate quasi-Department of the Prime Minister.
Although Brown rescinded the Order in Council that gave some of his staff legal authority to instruct civil
servants and moved the Chief Press Secretary out of No 12, he himself took over number 12 where he built
the “hub”, a large room in the middle of which he sat surrounded by the most important of his aides.
Coalition government
But the advent of a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government creates pressure towards greater
collegiality. If the government is to hold together, No.10 must take account of the views of Liberal Democrat
Cabinet members. Equally, if Cameron is perceived as neglecting the majority Conservative component of
his government then he will provoke resentment within his own party. These dual tendencies could increase
the importance of the PM operating in an inclusive fashion.
There will be significant barriers preventing Cameron freely from utilising some of the powers associated with
the office of Prime Minister. For example, his right to hire and fire ministers from the Liberal Democrat
contingent in his Cabinet will presumably be severely restricted.
At the same time it should not be supposed
the premiership will necessarily be at the
mercy of circumstances and it may be
possible to play countervailing tendencies
off against each-other to the advantage of
No.10. It may be that key decisions come to
be taken, not so much in full Cabinet or its
more regular sub-committees, but in some
kind of formal or informal bipartisan ‘inner
Cabinet’, or in bi-laterals between Cameron
and Clegg. Nonetheless Cameron cannot
ignore the necessity of some degree of
group involvement.
And collective responsibility may have its
advantages. The Liberal Democrats are
likely to seek to distance themselves from
some of the policies of the government in
which they are participating, such as
financial retrenchment measures. If the
principle of collective responsibility is
applied thoroughly, with major decisions
being fully discussed in Cabinet forums, then it will be harder for the Liberal Democrats to disassociate
being fully discussed in Cabinet forums, then it will be harder for the Liberal Democrats to disassociate
themselves from what the government does. Instruments of control wielded under Blair, such as No.10 staff,
may become instruments of collegiality, helping to facilitate rather than bypass Cabinet government.
Finally the coalition government may be stronger in Parliament than many commentators assume. And it is
never wise to under-estimate the concentration of executive power in the hands of ministers in UK
government, nor to lose sight of the significant patronage powers that any incumbent of No 10 can wield. If
the new government works well at its heart it may endure and perhaps help set a new paradigm as its two
chief protagonists claim so hard and so insistently to be doing. But much will depend upon wider
circumstances beyond Whitehall and Westminster, including the level of popularity of the new government
and the parties within it; and the economic performance of the UK.
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